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I. NATURE oF THE PROBLEM, AND THE VARious SoLUTIONs. 
When a contract is entered into in one State, and to be carried out in 
another-the States will be referred to as the places of execution and of 
performance, respectively-problems of conflict of laws arise.1 It will be 
assumed that the places of execution and of performance are known, although 
a number of difficulties arise in that connection.2 This article will be devoted 
*[Professor of Law, University of Southern California.] 
The author desires to express his appreciation of the kindness of the American 
Law Institute, through its Adviser on Professional Relations, Dean Herbert F. Good-
rich, in permitting examination, in galley proof, of the California annotations to the 
portion of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws relating to contracts. 
lThe same problem arises when different countries are involved; but the prin-
ciples applicable are the same, and for purposes of simplicity and clarity only States 
will be referred to in the text 
2See Conflict of Laws Restatement (1934), §§311-331, 355-357, 373-376, and Cali-
fornia Annotations. 
Readers are reminded that the section numbers in Professor Beale's great work 
on Conflict of Laws (1935) are the same as in the Restatement, so that a Fitation to 
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to the ascertainment of the California rule as to the law to govern matters 
relating to the entering into and carrying out of contracts in general, omitting 
special problems having to do with capacity,3 agency,4 transfers of con-
tractual rights5 and the assessment of damages.6 Special difficulties arising 
when there are several places of performance are also outside the scope of 
the present discussion.7 The problem with which we are concerned may 
therefore be defined as the selection by a court of the law to govern the 
entering into and carrying out of a contract between competent parties when 
made in one State and to be performed in another. 
The law relating to contracts has a number of facets of practical import-
ance, and in dealing with them, from the standpoint of conflict of laws, 
several alternatives are possible. They may all be treated from the stand-
point of a single body of law, of the place of execution or of perfonnance, 
or they may be divided between the two. There is still another possibility, 
that of applying the law of the State where litigation occurs. In conflict of 
laws parlance, that State is known as the forum, whether or not it is also 
the place of execution or of performance. This last possibility may be 
briefly rejected, as it has always been felt tbat, while each State must deter-
mine its own methods of judicial procedure,8 it manifestly would be unjust 
to the parties to apply the substantive law of a State because of the accident 
that one of its courts is applied to for relief. The law of the domicile of 
one or both of the parties is another possibility. While there has been a 
tendency to make use of the law of the domicile for purposes of interpreta-
tion,9 it never has been suggested that it should govern all contract matters. 
Problems arising in connection with consideration of the intention of the 
either automatically is a reference to the other. There is the formal difference that 
Beale's section numbers include a decimal point, and several may relate to material 
covered in a single section of the Restatement; but this can not lead to confusion. 
3See Conflict of Laws Restatement (1934), §§332(a), 333, 351, 366 (especially 
illustration 1), and, negatively, 358-360, and California Annotations. 
4See Conflict of Laws Restatement (1934), §§314-320, 324, 326, 328-331, 342-345, 
and California Annotations. 
5See Conflict of Laws Restatement (1934), §§348-354, and California Annota-
tions. 
6See Conflict of Laws Restatement (1934), §§372, 413-416, 418, 422-424, and 
California Annotations. 
7When there are several places of performance it has been felt, when the point 
has been considered, that ex necessitate all matters must be governed by the law of 
the place of execution. Sec the leading case of Morgan v. New Orleans, M. & T. 
R. R., Fed.Cas.#9804 (C.C. La. 1876). With some types of contracts, such as trans-
portation and sales, it is difficult to determine whether they should be regarded as 
having several places of performance, or whether the ultimate destination should be 
regarded as the sole place of performance. Throughout the conntry generally this 
seems not to have been worked out in the decisions. Bertonneau v. Southern Pacific 
Co., 17 Cal.App. 439, 445, 120 Pac. 53, 55 (1911), treats a transportation contract as 
having several States of performance. See 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), 1187, 
§337.1. 
BSee Conflict of Laws Restatement (1934), §§584-625. 
92 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), 1201, §346.2 Outside the field of contracts, 
see Conflict of Laws Restatement (1934), §§214(3), 251 (3), 285, 296, 308. 
1939] CONFLICT OF LAWS: CONTRACTS 337 
parties as to what law shall govern, whether or not it be that of the domicile 
of one or both, will be discussed later.10 
At first blush the most plausible method of dealing with our problem 
would seem to be to determine matters of execution by the law of the place 
of execution, and matters of performance by the law of the place of perform-
ance. As an abstract statement, this method would seem to offer no diffi-
culties, and to result in complete fairness to the parties. This has, indeed, 
been the historic method of approach, as set forth in the classic statement of 
Mr. Justice Hunt, of the United States Supreme Court, in the leading 
Scttdder case: 
"Matters bearing upon the execution, the interpretation, and the 
validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where 
the contract is made. Matters connected with its performance are 
regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters 
respecting the remedy, such as the bringing of suits, admissibility 
of evidence, statutes of limitation, depend upon the law of the 
place where the suit was brought."11 
Because this is the historic view, and perhaps that of the majority of 
American jurisdictions today, it has been adopted by the Restatement of 
the Conflict of Laws.12 The difficulty with it, as is recognized by the 
framers of the Restatement,13 is that it is based largely upon a distinction 
which it is logically impossible to draw. The validity of a contract in its 
every aspect determines every detail of performance, or, to take the reverse 
method of approach, whether and how a contract is to be performed will 
completely determine the nature of its validity. Thus from a legal stand-
point the execution and the performance aspects of a contract cannot be 
separated. The best that can be done is to do as is done in the Restate-
ment-act as though such a distinction were possible, divide up the various 
matters relating to contracts, and allocate them to the places of execution or 
of performance. In spite of the theoretical objection to this method of 
procedure, and the question whether any layman or lawyer can fairly be· 
expected to know the law of two States, it is often true, as pointed out in 
the comment of the drafters of the Restatement: 
"Regardless of the lack of logic, however, problems arising out of 
disputes upon contracts are settled as if certain acts pertained to the 
making of the contract and other acts to its performance."14 
lOSee text, infra, p. 342. 
llScudder v. Union Natl. Bank, 91 U.S. 406, 412, 23 L.Ed. 245, 249 (1875). 
Quoted: 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), 1106, §332.9; 2 Wharton, Conflict of Laws 
(Parmele's 3d ed. 1905), 863, §401; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 1938), 293, 
§111; Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (1937), 209, c. VIII. 
12Conflict of Laws Restatement (1934), §§332, 358, quoted in text, infra, p. 352. 
13Conflict of Laws Restatement (1934), §332, comment (c). 
14Conflict of Laws Restatement (1934), §332, comment (c). 
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Good practical results may be accomplished in this way. It is not the pur-
pose of this paper to discuss what the law should be, but to ascertain what 
the California law is. In the field of conflict of laws any problem as to 
what should be the law of a particular State requires study of the law of 
all the other jurisdictions. The present discussion will be limited to a 
consideration of the California statutes and decisions. The details of the 
Restatement method of dealing with the problem will be set forth later, 
immediately prior to examination of the cases decided in this State.u; 
The historic and Restatement view may well be termed the "splitting 
up" rule; while awkward, the appellation is descriptive. Instead of adopting 
it, many States have held that all contract matters are to be governed by 
the law of the place of performance, known as the "performance" rule.10 
The "execution" rule, that all matters are to be governed by the law of 
the place of execution, has very seldom been followed.U 
II. THE FIELD CODE PROVISIONS 
In California, the problem must be approached from the viewpoint of 
the relevant code provisions. The one about to be mentioned stands out 
like a very sore thumb to handicap the courts of this State in dealing with 
the problem. Section 1646 of the Civil Code18 provides: 
"A contract is to be interpreted according to the law and usage of 
the place where it is to be performed; or,l0 if it does not indicate a 
place of performance, according to the law and usage of the place 
where it is made." 
The significance of this will be appreciated when it is realized, in the light 
of the preceding discussion, that it universally has been true that if the 
law of the place of execution has been used for any purpose it has governed 
the interpretation of the contract.20 To use the law of the place of perform-
1GJnfra, p. 351 et seq. 
162 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), 1086, §332.3. 
172 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), 1267 at line 17, §360.3; ibid. 1270 at line 1, 
§362.1. Resort to the law of the place of executione~ necessitate when there are several 
States of performance, or when the parties did not select a place of perfonnance, 
is not considered an application of this rule. See footnote #7, s1epra. 
lBEnacted March 21, 1872. 
19The following portion of the code provision relates to a situation where, from 
the standpoint of the present discussion, there really is no conflict of laws problem. 
If the parties have not selected a place of perfonnance, e~ necessitate the law of 
the place of execution must be applied to all matters. 
20Jt is believed that the statement in the text is literally true as between the 
places of execution and perfonnance. There has, however, been at times a tendency 
to look to the law of the domicile for interpretation, even though the law of the place 
of execution is used for other purposes. The Restatement of Conflict of Laws, in 
§332(f), which adopts the law of the place of execution for several purposes, is not 
as clear in regard to this as it might be. It states that the law of the place of 
contracting detennines "the nature and extent of the duty for the performance 
of which a party becomes bound." It would seem naturally to follow that the 
system of law which detennines "the nature and extent of the duty" will 
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ance to decide matters of interpretation, and at the same time to apply the 
law of the place of execution to other matters relating to the coming into 
effect of the contract, would result in a distorted, unnatural system not yet 
conceived of by any jurist. It seems reasonable to conclude that if the 
law of the place of performance is to be used to govern interpretation it is 
also to control all other matters relating to the contract, that is, that the 
performance rule is to be followed.21 
Before reaching a final conclusion as to the state of the California 
statutory provisions, it is necessary to consider another portion of the codes. 
Section 1857 of the Code of Civil Procedure22 provides : 
"The language of a writing is to be interpreted according to the 
meaning it bears in the place of its execution, unless the parties 
have reference to a different place." 
At first glance the two sections quoted would appear to be in conflict, and 
the "reference" in the last clause of Section 1857 to establish an exception 
in case of an express stipulation by the parties that the law of the place of 
performance is to control. In view, however, of the practice, uncritical but 
often indulged in, of stating in the form used by the latter section the 
performance rule generally,23 it is altogether likely that that method of state-
govern the interpretation, and possibly this is indicated with sufficient clarity 
by the Restatement provision. As against this line of reasoning it may be 
argued, though erroneously, it is believed, that interpretation in this connection 
indicates ascertainment of the meaning of words, phrases, and clauses separately, as 
distinguished from the effect of the contract as a whole, the latter determining the 
nature and extent of the duty. Support for such a distinction may possibly be drawn 
from the Restatement comment (a) upon §332, which states that "the rules for ascer-
taining the meaning of the words of a contract" are not a question of the conflict 
of laws, and gives a cross-reference to the Restatement of Contracts. From the 
standpoint of organization of the materials covered by the various Restatements, it 
is possibly helpful to put the matter in this way. However, whenever the courts 
differ in regard to the rules of interpretation, a problem of conflict of laws is 
presented. It would then seem, to be in harmony with the Restatement position, that 
the law of the place of contracting should be applied. 
21The performance rule is discussed in 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), 1086, 
§332.3. 
22Enacted March 11, 1872. 
2l1An illustration contemporary with the drafting of the Field Codes appears in 
Dyke v. Erie Ry., 45 N.Y. 113, 116, 6 Am.St.Rep. 43, 44 (1871), Mr. Justice Allen 
speaking: "The generally received rule for the interpretation of contracts, is that 
they are to be construed and interpreted according to the laws of the State in 
which they are made unless from their terms, it is perceived that they were entered 
into with a view to the laws of some other State. The lex loci contractus, deter-
mines the nature, validity, obligation and legal effect of the contract, and gives the 
rule of construction and interpretation, unless it appears to have been made with 
reference to the laws and usages of some other State or government, as when it is 
to be performed in another place, and then in conformity to the presumed intention 
of the parties, the law of the place of performance furnishes the rule of interpre-
tation." (citing cases) To the same effect: Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting 
Co., 108 Conn. 333, 338, 143 Atl. 163, 164 (1928), quoting earlier cases. 
This form of statement may be traced back to dictum by Lord Mansfield in 
Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077, 1078, 1 W.Bl. 234, 256, 97 Eng.Rep. 717 (1760) : 
"The law of the place can never be the rule, where the transaction is entered into 
with an express view to the law of another country." This was accepted by Judge 
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ment was what was in the mind of the draftsman of Section 1857. If so, the 
section should be interpreted as though it read as does Section 1646. The 
method of statement is uncritical, in that it is simply a round-about way of 
stating the performance rule. 
If it is felt that "reference" in the limiting clause of Section 1857 must 
be interpreted to relate to an express stipulation by the parties, then, in the 
absence of such a stipulation, the two sections are in conflict. This makes 
it necessary to note that Section 1857 relates to "writings," whereas Section 
1646 refers to "contracts." As a contract, unless oral or implied, is one 
form of a writing, the canon of construction is applicable that a specific 
provision controls a general. No good reason for a distinction between 
contracts and other forms of writings is apparent, but that is a matter of 
legislative policy, not of interpretation of the law. The controlling position 
of Section 1646 may further be supported upon the ground that it was 
adopted March 21, 1872, whereas Section 1857 was enact~d ten days earlier, 
and was therefore subject to implied repeal to the extent of any repugnancy. 
A distinction between oral and implied contracts and those in writing could 
be worked out, but it seems that this far-fetched possibility may safely be 
disregarded, notwithstanding the fact that a slight measure of support for 
limiting Section 1646 to oral and implied contracts may be drawn from the 
fact that Section 1857 provides for the contingency of a "reference" by the 
parties to the law of a State other than that of execution. Such a reference 
is perhaps more likely to occur in a written contract than in connection 
with one which is implied or oral. On the other hand, Section 1646 provides 
for an "indication" by the parties of a place of performance, and this is 
perhaps more likely to occur in a written contract than in one which IS 
oral or implied. 
Story, who, after stating that in general the law of the place of the contract governs, 
adds: "But where the contract is either expressly or tacitly to be performed in any 
other place there the general rule is, in confc;>rmity to the presumed intention of the 
parties, that the contract as to its validity . . . is to be governed by law of the 
place of performance." Story, Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 1841), §280. See also 3 
Kent, Commentaries (1st ed. 1828), 481. The writer is here indebted to Stumberg, 
Conflict of Laws (1937), 209, c.VIII. 
Mr. Justice Rhodes, of the Supreme Court of California, used the same form 
of statement, in 1867: ". . . The rule is that [contracts] are to be interpreted by 
the law of the place where they became complete contracts, unless they are to be 
performed elsewhere." Dow v. Gould & Curry S. M. Co., 31 Cal. 629, 652 (1867). 
Again, Mr. Commissioner Searls said, in Palmer v. Atchison, etc., R. R., 101 
Cal. 187, 195, 35 Pac. 630, 633 (1894): "The law of the place where the contract 
is made governs in determining the liability of the carrier, unless the parties at the 
time of making it had some other law in view:" (citing cases) 
Mr. Justice Brewer, in •Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144, 148, 22 Sup.Ct. 52, 54, 
46 L.Ed. 12"5, 127 (1901), said that the State where a corporation is chartered "is 
the place of contract, and, generally, the law of the place where a contract is made 
governs its nature, interpretation and obligation. While this is so, it is also true 
that parties in making a contract may have in view some other law than that of the 
place, and when that is so that other law will control. That the parties have some 
other law in view and contract with reference to it is shown by an express declara-
tion to that effect. In the absence of such declaration it may be disclosed by the 
terms of the contract and the purpose with which it is entered into." 
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Section 1857 refers to the "language" of a writing, whereas Section 
1646 refers to the interpretation of contracts, without mentioning the lan-
guage; but, as a contract, unless implied, is entirely composed of language, 
and if implied is generally based upon language, it is difficult to see how 
this difference in phraseology can be of any significance. It seems safe to 
disregard the possibility that a distinction between implied and other forms 
of contracts is intended. Likewise it seems safe to disregard the far-fetched 
and altogether erroneous possibility of holding that Section 1857, beeause 
it speaks of the "language" of a writing, relates to interpretation of the 
language, considered narrowly and apart from. the meaning of the writing 
as a whole, and that Section 1646, as applied to contracts, is to be given 
the latter and broader meaning because it does not refer to the "language" 
of the contract. While a distinction of that character is sometimes drawn 
between construction and interpretation,24 both the sections under consider-
ation refer to interpretation. 
Let us return to the limitation in Section 1857, "unless the parties have 
reference to a different place." If, contrary to the views expressed, this is 
to be interpreted as referring to an express statement by the parties, the 
question is presented whether a writing containing such a "reference" 
involves a more specific situation than that relating to contracts in general, 
covered by Section 1646, and is therefore to control the latter, using again 
the canon of construction that a specific provision controls a general. As· 
the limitation in Section 1857 is attached to a statute relating to "writings," 
whereas all of Section 1646 relates to contracts, this would seem to be a 
strained construction, which may safely be disregarded. As "writings" are 
broader than "contracts," it seems clear that all portions of a statutory 
provision relating to "writing'' should be treated as having the broader 
signification, leaving Section 1646, in regard to "contracts," still the more 
specific, and therefore controlling. 
Another interpretation of "reference" in 1857 is possible, that it relates, 
not to a specific stipulation by the parties, but to certain types of fact situ-
ations which would make the jurisdiction of performance more intimately 
associated with the writing than the State of execution, and therefore more 
prominent in the minds of the parties. This would give the "reference" in 
Section 1857 a meaning different from that of the "indication" in Section 
1646, but if applied would create a large hazy borderland through which the 
courts would have to thread their way, and would lead to limitless specula-
tion in endeavoring to classify never-ending series of fact situations in 
accordance with such a distinction. As already pointed out, it is reasonable 
to believe that the framer of Section 1857 had an entirely different thought 
in mind, and the present hypothesis does not seem to justify further develop-
ment. 
242 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), 972 & 1199, §§251.1 & 346.1. 
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Terminating our consideration of Section 1857, it seems safe to conclude 
that it may properly be eliminated, as controlled in regard to contracts by 
the more specific provisions of Section 1646. The logic of the statutory 
situation in California therefore seems to point inexorably to the controlling 
effect of what has been described as the performance rule. The dim light 
shed by the decisions of the courts of the State will be inquired into later.2G 
It has already been pointed out that the performance rule is at variance with 
the position taken by the Restatement26 and by many other jurisdictions. 
III. INTENTION OF THE PARTIES 
1. EXPRESSED INTENTION 
Where any recognition is given by the courts to the intention of the 
parties that the law of a certain jurisdiction shall control, this is referred to 
as the "intention" rule. However, whatever rule is adopted-execution, 
performance or Restatement-it is commonly ascribed to the intention of 
the parties supposed by the court to exist. This means nothing, if, as is 
often true, in the clearest case possible-the express statement by the parties 
as to what their intention is-the same court will refuse to be bound by it. 
The student of the law must therefore be on his guard in connection with 
terminology relating to the intention of the parties. 
It should also be noted that even the most consistent endeavor to follow 
the intention of the parties, and thus apply the intention rule, will not solve 
all problems. In many cases there will be no reason to believe that the 
parties have given any thought to choice of the governing law, or that if they 
had they would have had any definite intention. The contract may be valid 
or invalid, with varying effects, by the law of both the places of execution 
and of performance. In such a situation, the court is compelled to select one 
of the other rules. Adoption of the so-called intention rule is not, therefore, 
exclusive of the existence in the same jurisdiction of one of the other rules. 
Section 1646 of the Civil Code, already discussed, seemingly requiring 
adoption of the performance rule, should not militate against the existence 
of the intention rule in this State. The latter, when it exists, has to do 
with a relatively specific problem, and should not be affected by such a 
general statute. 
The first situation to be considered is where the parties have stipulated 
that the law of a certain State shall control. The viewpoint of Professor 
Beale, 27 with all the weight of his outstanding leadership in this field, 
followed by the Restatement,28 is that no effect should be given to such a 
25See text, it~fra, p. 347 et seq. 
26Conflict of Laws Restatement (1934), §§332 & 358, quoted in text, infra, at 
footnote #67; and see text, supra, at footnote #16, and infra, p. 351. 
272 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), 1079, §332.2. 
28There is no provision in the Restatement for recognition of the intention of 
the parties. 
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stipulation.~ Professor Beale holds that to do so would permit the parties 
to make their own law, which should be done for them by the courts.30 This 
position is unsound, as it is entirely proper, from a jurisprudential stand-
point,31 for the courts to take into consideration, as one of the operative 
facts, any relevant intention of the parties.32 That such intention relates to 
the legal result to be achieved is not a valid objection, provided the parties 
are acting in good faith33 in order to accomplish a legitimate purpose.3 i 
Particularly in a field where there is so much confusion and difference of 
opinion among the courts,35 is it highly desirable, as a matter of social policy, 
21JAt times, at least in other connections, the courts, possibly unconsciously, have 
permitted an intention, that a certain system of law shall control, to militate against 
the reaching of that conclusion. Having found that a certain legal result, such as 
securing a domicile, is desired, an acute suspicion is aroused in regard to the facts, 
normally regarded as operative, which are put in evidence. A good example is 
Kerby v. Charlestown, 78 N.H. 301, 99 Atl. 835, L.R.A.1917D 785 (1916). The same 
line of thought may be observed in 1 Wharton, Conflict of Laws (Parmele's 3d ed. 
1905), 126, §56a. A good case contra is Matter of Newcomb, 192 N.Y. 238, 84 N.E. 
950 (1908). 
302 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), 1079, §332.2. Following Beale: Goodrich, 
Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 1938), 278, §107. Lorenzen feels that the expressed inten-
tion of the parties should control the carrying out of the contract, although not its 
validity. Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30 Yale L.Jour. 
565, 655 at 672, 31 ibid. 53, 72 (1921). Following Lorenzen: Stumberg, Conflict of 
Laws (1937), 211, 238. The present writer believes that the public policy in favor 
of certainty outweighs the logic of the distinction made, and justifies use of the 
expressed intention even as to validity. Too great adherence to logic in this con-
nection becomes provincialism. Going the entire distance in favor of expressed 
intention : Cook, "Contracts" and the Conflict of Laws : Intention of the Parties, 
32 Ill.L.Rev. 898, 919 (1938). It has even been argued that it would not do any 
good for the parties to make a statement of their intention, "for the court might 
find that they really intended a different law from the one they said they intended." 
Commentaries on Conflict of Laws, Restatement No. 4 (1928), 24, §353 (c)-(g), 
(§332 as adopted). A distinction has been suggested, imported from the civil law, 
between formal and essential validity, governing the former by the law of the place 
of execution and the latter by the intention of the parties. 2 Wharton, Conflict of 
Laws (Parmele's 3d ed. 1905), 901, 913, §§427e, 4271; 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 
(1935), 1100, §332.6. 
31The International Law Association has approved giving effect to the expressed 
intention of the parties. Robinson, Conflicts of Laws in Contracts of Sale, 16 Geo. 
L.]our. 386, 388 (1928). 
32Probably no court would hesitate to give effect to a contract provision 
because it followed the wording of a statute. It would seem to follow that incor-
poration by reference of a statute should be permitted. If so, is it not logical to let 
the parties achieve brevity by stipulating that the law of a certain State shall 
control? 
33If a jurisdiction is selected which is not the domicile of any of the parties, 
and does not have a substantial connection with any of the other facts which may 
be regarded as operative, it may properly be considered that the parties are not 
acting in good faith. Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict 
of Laws, 30 Yale L.Jour. 565, 656 at 672, 31-ibid. 53 (1921); Annotation, 112 A.L.R. 
124 (1938). 
3iThe usury cases throughout the country are interesting in this connection. See, 
for example: Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky, 210 Cal. 428, 202 Pac. 474 (1930) ; 
Kraemer v. Coward, 2 Cal.App.(2d) 506, 38 Pac.(2d) 458 (1934). Many cases 
throughout the country have held that the court will use either the law of the 
place of execution or of performance, whichever permits the higher rate of interest, 
provided the parties are acting in good faith. For a decision largely destroying 
the good faith requirement, see Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 
403, 47 Sup.Ct. 626, 71 L.Ed. 1123 (1927). 
15Professor Beale points out that "almost every rule ever suggested for de-
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that the parties be assisted, through the expression of their intention, in at-
taining certainty as to the law which will control. There will often be no 
other way that a lawyer will be able to advise the parties with certainty, and 
the ability to do this is one of the most important tests of the success of any 
legal system. 
In California, in addition to Section 1857, relating to the interpretation 
of writings, which it is believed has already been sufficiently disposed of,86 
there 1s another code provision which, at first glance, may seem to be 
applicable. Before quoting the code section it may be well to point out that 
its position in the code37 shows that in preparing it the draftsman did not 
have conflict of laws problems in mind. It is one of the most important 
basic principles in this field, sometimes violated, that a statute, in enacting 
which the legislature was not considering conflict of laws problems, should 
not be allowed to have any effect in determining what system of law shall 
control. At the expense of resorting to a possibly overly simple illustration, 
suppose that a statute in regard to contracts fails to mention infants--would 
any court hold that it had any effect as to the law of infancy? 
Section 3268 of the Civil Code3S provides: 
"Except where it is otherwise declared, the provisions of the fore-
going fifteen titles of this part, in respect to the rights and obliga-
tions of parties to contracts, are subordinate to the intention of 
the parties, when ascertained in the manner prescribed by the chap-
ter on the interpretation of contracts; and the benefit thereof may be 
waived by any party entitled thereto, unless such waiver would be 
against public policy." 
The titles referred to in the section cover "Obligations Arising from Par-
ticular Transactions," but do not include the chapter which contains Section 
1646, already discussed,39 adopting the performance rule in regard to the 
interpretation of contracts. Using the line of reasoning above set forth, it 
seems clear that this provision has no application to conflict of laws prob-
lems.40 
tennining the law applicable to the validity of a contract which has ever been 
seriously urged in a common-law court has at one time or another been adopted 
by the Supreme Court of the United States as the basis of its decision; that each 
decision has been made apparently without realizing its inconsistency with former 
decisions; and that many of the decisions are self-contradictory." 2 Beale, Con-
flict of Laws (1935), 1108, §332.9. See also ibid. 1077, §332.1. 
36See text, stepra, at footnotes # #22-24. 
37This is not applicable to Cal.Civ.Code, §1643, discussed in the following sub-
division of this article, relating to the intention to validate principle. See text, 
infra, at footnotes ##52-53. 
38Enacted March 21, 1872. 
39See text, supra, at footnotes ##18-21. 
40Cal.Civ.Code, §§1636 et seq., contain provisions relating generally to intention 
of the parties to contracts. Apart from §1643, discussed infra in the text, at 
footnote #52, it seems clear, "beyond peradventure of a doubt," that they have 
no application to conflict of laws problems. 
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A very fine opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Waste, then Presiding Justice 
of the First District Court of Appeal, holds squarely that the parties may 
stipulate what law shall control. The case, BooZe v. Union Mercantile 
Insurance Company,41 involved a loss in San Francisco Bay under a marine 
insurance policy. It seemed to be assumed that, but for the provision in the 
policy to the contrary, the California law, different from the English, would 
have been applicable. The opinion reads : 
"We are not aware of any legislative declaration that would prohibit 
the parties to such an insurance policy from contracting that the 
law of England shall govern in the determination of what shall con-
stitute a constructive total loss under such policy. It is the general 
rule in this state that, except where it is otherwise declared, the 
provisions of the Civil Code, with respect to the rights and obliga-
tions of parties to contracts, are subordinate to the intention of the 
parties when ascertained in the manner prescribed by the laws 
relating to the interpretation of contracts. The benefit of such pro-
vision may be waived by any party entitled thereto, unless such 
waiver would be contrary to public policy."42 
In addition to Section 3268 of the Civil Code,43 the case of Griffith v. New 
York Life Insurance Company, 43a involving a specific waiver of a require-
ment imposed by a New York statute, is cited in support. 
In Bertonneau v. Southern Pacific Company,43b there is a dictum by 
Mr. Justice James that the expressed or implied intention of the parties is 
to control. Flittner v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,44 a poorly 
thought out opinion, contains a dictum45 that the intention of the parties, 
expressed or presumed, is to control as to the law governing the obligation 
of the contract, although intention is to be disregarded in determining 
whether a contract has come into existence. In Palmer v. Atchison, Topeka 
& Santa Fe Railroad,45a Mr. Commissioner Searls indicated a desire to give 
effect to the intention of the parties, saying : 
"The law of the place where the contract is made governs in deter-
mining the liability of the carrier, unless the parties at the time of 
making it had some other law in view. [citing cases] 
4152 Cal.App. 207, 198 Pac. 416 (1921), hearing denied by supreme court. 
42Boole v. Union Mere. Ins. Co., 52 Cal.App. 207, 210, 198 IPac. 416, 417 (1921). 
43It is not entirely clear how the court meant to cite §3268. The case did 
not involve a waiver, so that the last sentence before the citations was a dictum. 
If §3268 ,yas cited only in support of the dictum, it was correctly used. The 
further citation of a decision relating to a waiver would indicate that this was the 
court's intention. If §3268 was meant to support the entire statement quoted, the 
citation was erroneous, for the reason that, as is suggested in the text, it is not 
believed that that section properly has any application to conflict of laws problems. 
43a101 Cal. 627, 36 Pac. 113, 40 Am.StRep. 96 (1894). 
4Sb17 Cal.App. 439, 443, 120 Pac. 53, 54 (1911). 
4430 Cal.App. 209, 157 Pac. 630 (1916); consult California Annotations, Conflict 
of Laws Restatement (1939), §§311, 317 & .333. 
4530 Cal.App. 209, 215, 157 Pac. 630, 633 (1916). 
41ia10l Cal. 187, .35 Pac. 630 (1894). 
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"There are exceptions to this rule founded upon the supposed in-
tention of the parties, gathered from circumstances surrounding the 
transaction." [citing case] 46 
·~~.4 
.. ~ 
Until it is overruled, the excellent BooZe decisiou establishes as the law 
of this State the desirable rule that the e.."q)ressed intention of the parties is 
controlling. Possibly it should be added that it seems clear that the range 
of choice by the parties is limited to those States having a substantial con-
nection with the facts of the situation.47 The domicile of each of tqe parties 
should be included.48 
2. INTENTION TO VALIDATE 
There is another sense in which the intention of the parties has some-
times been used, although, apart from usury, probably never by more than 
a small minority of jurisdictions. It is said that the parties must have 
intended to have an operative legal transaction, and that therefore that 
system of law49 will be held'to be applicable which will have that effect.110 
That this is a genuine intention of the parties the writer can testify, from 
the number of times he has been told by farmers: "Now, young fellow, you 
fix that so it'll stick." Here, again, public policy seems clearly to justify 
use of the intention of the parties, in order to attain certainty, and there is 
no sound jurisprudential objection. 51 
A California code section possibly was intended to incorporate this rule. 
Section 1643 of the Civil Code52 provides: 
"A contract must receive such an interpretation as will make it 
lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being carried 
into effect, if it can be done without violating the intention of the 
parties." 
The proximity of this section to Section 1646, discussed above at length, 116 
adopting in part the performance rule, affords some basis for holding that 
in framing Section 1643 the draftsman had in mind conflict of laws prob-
46Falmer v. Atchison etc. R. R., 101 Cal. 187, 195, 35 Pac. 630, 633 (1894). 
The form of statement used by the learned commissioner indicates that he did not 
have in mind an express provision by the parties as to their intention; but pre-
sumably he did not intend to exclude such an intention. 
470wens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 58 R.I. 162, 170, 192 Atl. 158, 164, 
112 A.L.R. 113, 122 (1937), and annotation, 112 A.L.R. 124 (1938). 
4BAnnotation, Validity and Effect of Stipulation in Contract to the Effect That 
it Shall be Governed by the Law of a Particular State Which Is Neither the 
Place Where the Contract is Made Nor the IP!ace Where it is to be Performed, 
112 A.L.R. 124 (1938). 
49Having a substantial connection with the facts of the case. See text, st~pra, 
at footnote #47. 
502 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), 1259, §355.1; 2 Wharton, Conflict of Laws 
(Parmele's 3d ed. 1905), 944-947, §§429-429a. 
51See text, sr~pra, at footnotes ##30-35, and footnotes ##30 & 32. 
52Enacted March 21, 1872. 
IS3Consult text, mpra, at footnotes # #18-21. 
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lems. However, as most statutes do not relate to conflict of laws, there is 
a presumption against such an interpretation, and the internal character of 
this section indicates that it was not intended to apply to this field. The 
eiusdem generis canon of construction, if applied to the contents of the 
section, results in the conclusion that "operative," and "capable of being 
carried into effect," have to do only with legality under the domestic law of 
the State. 
Section 3541 of the Civil Code54 is to the same effect. It reads : 
"An interpretation which gives effect is preferred to one which 
makes void." 
The position of this section in the code is entirely devoid of conflict of laws 
connotations, and here it seems even more clear that the provision should 
be held to relate only to validity under the local law. 
Both of these sections were used by the Supreme Court of California, 
however, in Robbins v. Pacific Eastern Corporation,55 in support of a con-
clusion that a stock sale was made in New York, rather than California, 
and was therefore unimpeachable under the Corporate Securities Act of this 
State. A dictum to the opposite effect, in the earlier District Court of 
Appeal Flittner case,56 already spoken of disparagingly,57 has been referred 
to, the court there stating that matters relating to the coming into existence 
of a contract "are in general governed by a fixed law, which is independent 
of and cannot be varied by the intention of the parties."58 The Robbins 
case seems to establish the desirable intention-to-validate rule as a part of 
the jurisprudence of this State.58a 
IV. THE DECISIONS 
1. CODE SECTIONS CONSIDERED 
We shall now return to consideration of the central problem, that is, 
the law governing contracts apart from the intention of the parties. It will 
be recalled that the code provisions which have been discussed, 59 in par-
ticular Section 1646 of the Civil Code, that a contract "is to be interpreted 
according to the law and usage of the place where it is to be performed," 
seem to require adoption of the performance rule, that is, that the law of 
the place of performance governs all contract matters. Only three decisions 
54Enacted March 21, 1872. 
558 Cal.(2d) 241, 273, 65 Pac.(2d) 42, 58 (1937). The court quoted from 6 
Cal.Jur., Contracts (1922), 268, §168. 
56Flittner v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 30 Cal.App. 209, 215, 157 Pac. 630, 633 
(1916). 
57Consult text, supra, at footnote #44. 
5BF1ittner v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 30 Cal.App. 209, 215, 157 Pac. 630, 
633 (1916). 
5SaFor a discussion of the Robbins case, consult Note, 11 SouTHERN CALIFORNIA 
LAw REvmw, 345 (1938). 
59Text, supra, at footnotes ##18-26. 
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in the history of the State have been found which refer to these code pro-
vtstons. The first of these cases is the Blochman case,60 in the Second 
District Court of Appeal. It is a strong decision upon the facts, relating to 
a note executed in Mexico and payable in this country. The court was not 
confronted with a choice between two possible interpretations of an admit-
tedly valid contract, but it was claimed "that under the laws of Mexico the 
note could not be enforced as a commercial instrument and was void because 
it was not in the form and substance required by those laws."61 Mr. Pre-
siding Justice Conrey quoted Section 1646 in answer to that contention.62 
Possibly unconsciously, the court is therefore applying the performance rule 
to a question of validity, notwithstanding the language of the code section 
that a contract is to be "interpreted" in accordance with the law of the piace 
of performance. 63 
In Utah State National Bank v. Smith,64 (technically not a precedent), 
turning upon the negotiability of a note, Mr. Justice Works said: 
"The note was signed and delivered in California, but by its terms 
it was made payable in Utah. . . . The contention that the law 
of Utah governs the situation is correct. The terms of a promis-
sory note are to be interpreted according to the law of the place 
at which it is to be paid. (Civ. Code, sec. 1646; Blochman Coml. 
& Sav. Bk. v. Ketcham, 171 Pac. 1084."65 
60Blochman Comml. & Sav. Bank v. Ketcham, 36 Cal.App. 284, 171 Pac. 1084 
(1918). 
61Blochman Comml. & Sav. Bank v. Ketcham, 36 Cal.App. 284, 287, 171 Pac. 
1084, 1085 (1918). 
62Upon the facts, the case also presents a very unusual problem, not con-
sidered by the court, relating to use of the law of the place of performance. 
The suit was brought upon a note executed and delivered in Mexico, with a blank 
after the word "at," referring to the place of payment. It was held that leaving 
the blank was an implied authority to the holder to insert any point, including 
one in this country. It is questionable whether the place of performanc!! should 
be resorted to for any legal purposes (other than details of local custom) when 
its existence as such is due to the unilateral act of one of the parties subsequent 
to the contract's coming into effect. 
63In the California annotations to §334 of the Restatement, the following 
statement is made in regard to this case: "This is not really contrary to the 
Restatement, for the Court considered the question to be one of interpretation and 
applied §1646 of the Civil Code, under which a contract is to be interpreted ac-
cording to the laws and usage of the place where it is to be performed." As-
suming that the court was conscious of the nature of the case, it is inexact to 
state that the case is not in conflict with the Restatement, because, as is pointed 
out in the text, the question actually involved was one of validity. If interpre-
tation is the proper standpoint from which to consider the case, interpre-
tation would seem clearly to be included within the "nature and extent of the duty," 
which by §332(f) of the Restatement is assigned to the law of the place of con-
tracting. In the annotations to §346 the case is cited as in accord with the Re-
statement. It is also cited with §336, and further discussed with §345. 
6426 Cal.App.Dec. 1195 (1918), discussed in Note," 6 CAL.L.REv. 45~, 456 (1918). 
65Utah State Natl. Bank v. Smith, 26 Cal.App.Dec. 1195 (1918). 
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Upon hearing in the same case in the supreme court,66 Mr. Justice Wilbur 
held: 
"The note in question was dated and payable in Utah, and its 
negotiability must be determined by the law of the place of pay-
ment. (1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 6th ed., sees. 865, 
879; Wharton on Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed., 451d; notes, 61 L. R. 
A. 209; 19 L. R. A (N. S.) 670, 671.)"67 
Notwithstanding the use of the expression "dated," the decision may be 
regarded as an authority in point. 68 
The last decision, the Pray case, 69 in the First District Court of Appeal, 
adds little. It involved a contract of sale of lumber, apparently made as 
well as to be carried out in California. The court applied the same code 
section, in a rather weak manner, to justify admission of evidence of a 
custom relating to inspection at the point of destination.70 
At any rate, the cases which have given consideration to the statutory 
elements involved have applied the performance rule as the law of this State. 
2. VACUITY OF OTHER DECISIONS 
As far as the remaining decisions dealing with the problem are con-
cerned, as they are decided without reference to the code sections, their 
value is slight. As most of these cases were decided in blissful ignorance of 
prevailing statutory provisions, one is tempted to put those decided before 
the enactment of the codes upon the same level with the rest, and disregard 
their priority. However, in the few instances where such priority does 
exist, it 'vill be here noted. It should also be observed that the Cali-
fornia annotations possibly too uncritically follow the Restatement in 
G6J80 Cal. 1, 179 Pac. 160 (1919). 
G71Jtah State Natl. Bank v. Smith, 180 Cal. 1, 2, 179 Pac. 160 (1919). 
GSI£ Utah were the place of execution as well as of payment, the portion 
quoted would be dictum. There is nothing else in the opinion to indicate that the 
supreme court meant to find the facts differently from the district court of appeal. 
•Presumably a looser form of e.xpression is being used than that in the opinion 
below, and reference made by "dated" to the the face of the instrument, as dis-
tinguished from the place of coming into legal effect. 
69Pray v. Trower Lbr. Co., 101 Cal.App. 482, 281 Pac. 1036 (1929), hearing 
denied by supreme court. The case is cited in the California annotations to §346 
of the Restatement, f[7. 
10Mr. Justice Gray said, at 101 Cal.App. 490, 281 Pac. 1039: "Defendant also 
moved to. strike all of the testimony of one plaintiff as to this custom on the 
ground that he testified he was unfamiliar with the custom at the place of per-
formance. This witness, however, also testified that this custom was general in 
the business. Of course the contract was to be interpreted according to the usage 
of the place of performance. (Civ.Code, sec. 1646.) The error, if any, was cured 
by the testimony of Butterick, the defendant's witness, who, on direct examination, 
stated this custom existed at Los Angeles." It is likely that all jurisdictions would 
agree that such a local custom at the place of performance is to be complied with 
by the parties. 
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its adoption of the alternative "splitting up" rule71-at least a perusal of the 
annotations would not lead one to suspect that the California law might be 
other than the Restatement rule,72 and, incidentally, most of the cases cited 
are not of any help one way or the other. 
In reading many cases not referred to in this article, one can not help 
being struck by the number in which the facts involved more than a single 
State, and there is no reference to the conflict of laws possibilities of the 
situation. It may be that in these cases counsel had decided that no 
advantage could be gained from resort to conflict of laws principles, but 
this would seem to be a violent assumption. It seems not amiss to suggest 
that the cases indicate that the profession has not attached sufficient 
importance to the practical aspects of the subject of conflict of laws. An 
attorney's mind is largely occupied with problems involving only the law 
of his own State, especially in the smaller communities. This leads to lack 
of familiarity with the field of conflict of laws, and makes it necessary for 
liim to guard against ·the likelihood that the existence of a problem in this 
field will be overlooked. It is overly easy to assume that the local law is 
applicable. The thought which has been suggested also occurred to an able 
practitioner. The late Edward W. Hinton, distinguished professor of law 
at the University of Chicago, told the writer that for about twenty years he 
represented a railroad at a division point in Missouri near the Kansas line, 
that suits were constantly being brought in Missouri upon causes of action 
arising in Kansas, and that it very rarely occurred to counsel that their 
clients might be able to derive benefit from the law of Kansas. When the 
writer was in practice there was a like innocence of constitutional law 
problems. It may be assumed that in recent years such childlike faith in the 
legality of statutes has been rudely disturbed. 
The case of Andreds v. Zook72a is interesting in the present connection. 
The question was whether the statute of limitations had run upon the later 
installments of a note, this turning upon whether the acceleration clause 
operated automatically or as a matter of option upon the part of the holder. 
The note was dated and payable in Iowa, and presumably there executed. 
The court discussed the conflict of authority upon the point, and decided it 
entirely as a matter of California law, incidentally citing an Iowa case in 
harmony with the result reached. In the recent case of Sullivan v. Sttlli-
71The validity of this criticism is doubtful-the purpose of the annotations is 
simply to reflect the decisions, not to study afresh the entire body of law. 
72Jn numerous instances the cases are cited as in harmony with the Re-
statement position (the extent to which the decisions as a whole support the 
Restatement will be considered in the text, infra, pp. 351 et seq. In the following 
sections of the annotations express statements in support of the Restatement position 
are made: §311 (place of contracting), §334 (also early case contra, and ques-
tion raised in connection with another case), §337, §344 & §346. In the following 
sections are to be found statements or citations contra to the Restatement, or 
questioning its being followed: §§334, 339 & 349. 
72a125 Cal.App. 19, 13 Pac. (2d) 518 (1932). 
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van, 72b the same problem was presented in connection with a note executed 
and payable in New York, and when the conflict of laws point was presented 
to the court the decision was made as a matter of New York law. 
The early case of Wild v. Van V alkenburgh72c is interesting as showing 
the mental processes of the court in the formative period of the law of a 
pioneer State. The case involved a note dated and payable in New York, 
and presumably there executed. The question was whether, in a suit against 
a maker, it was necessary to allege demand at the place fixed for payment. 
It was pointed out that the rule in this country, outside of Indiana and 
Louisiana, was that demand was not necessary, the English rule being contra. 
The court was greatly impressed by Story's argument, which is quoted, that 
it might be very inconvenient for the maker to have to pay in a different 
city from that agreed upon, when he might have funds ready in the latter. 
Mr. Chief Justice Murray then continued: 
"The English and American authorities on this subject have been 
so ably reviewed by Judge Story and Chancellor Kent, both of 
whom agree that [the] English rule is correct, [that] nothing is left 
us to do except to adopt one or the other as a rule. If the Amer-
ican decisions were supported by the same reasoning and high 
authority as the English, we might be inclined to follow them; but 
this state is so far removed from the commercial world, and the 
rates of exchange so largely against our merchants and citizens, 
that it would be more proper to adopt a rule which, we think, is 
founded on some logic, and calculated to protect the interests of 
our people."73 
It seems reasonable to assume that if it had been pointed out to the court 
that, by adopting the English rule, it would, in all probability, be changing 
the character of the substantive obligation from that which existed where 
the debt was contracted and payable, it would have followed the majority 
American rule. 
In view of the paucity of helpful judicial material,74 it is recommended 
tl1at the busy attorney who has favored us with his attention thus far 
terminate his reading of this paper at this point. Those who, being inured 
to the laborious processes of the law, feel that they must examine all the 
cases, or whose professional duty requires them to do so, may continue. 
Student readers are urged to desist. 
3. THE RESTATEMENT CRITERION 
In considering the cases which have dealt with our problem without 
reference to the code provisions, it will be helpful to use the Restatement, 
or "splitting up," rule as a criterion. It is based upon, and an elaboration 
72b25 Cal.App.(2d) 422, 77 Pac.(2d) 498 (1938). 
72c7 Cal. 166 (1857). 
78Wild v. Van Valkenburgh, 7 Cal. 166, 168 • (1857) (italics added). 
74Professor Beale describes the state of the California law as "doubtful." 
2 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), 1124, §332.13. 
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of, the classic statement · of the historical method of approach to these 
problems in the Scudder case,1G already quoted.76 The alternatives, it will 
be recalled, are the execution and performance ruies, and, in part, the 
intention ruie. 
The Restatement ruie is summarized in Sections 332 and 358: 
§332. "The law of the place of contracting determines the 
validity and effect of a promise with respect to 
" (a) capacity to make the contract ; 
"(b) the necessary form, if any, in which the promise must be 
made; 
" (c) the mutual assent or consideration, if any, required to 
make a promise binding; 
"(d) any other requirements for making a promise binding; 
"(e) fraud, illegality, or any other circumstances which make 
a promise void or voidable; 
"(f) except as stated in §358, the nature and extent of the 
duty for the performance of which a party becomes bound; 
"(g) the time when and the place where the promise is by its 
terms to be performed; 
"(h) the absolute or conditional character of the promise." 
. §358. "The duty for the performance of which a party to a 
contract is bound will be discharged by compliance with the law 
of the place of performance of the promise with respect to: 
" (a). the manner of performance; 
"(b) the time and locality of performance; 
"(c) the person or persons by whom or to whom performance 
shall be made or rendered ; 
" (d) the sufficiency of performance; 
" (e) excuse for non-performance." 
The logical difficulty in attempting to divide up the various facts and 
problems relating to contracts in this way has been discussed.77 
4. FOUR LOGICAL POSSIBILITIES 
Continuing our discussion along the lines of the Restatement distinc-
tion, there seem to be four logical possibilities as to the character of the 
cases, and they will be considered in accordance with this classification: 
( 1) Apply the law of the place of execution to execution facts. This 
is consistent with the Restatement, but not with the performance rule. 
(2) Apply the law of the place of execution to performance facts. 
75Scudder v. Union Nat!. Bank, 91 U.S. 406, 412, 23 L.Ed. 245, 249 (1875). 
Quoted: 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws {1935), 1106, §332.9; 2 Wharton, Conflict of 
Laws (Parmele's 3d ed. 1905), 863, §401; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 1938), 
293, §111; Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (1937), 209, c. VIII. 
76See text, supra, at footnote #11. 
77See text, supra, at footnotes # #13-14. 
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This is consistent neither with the Restatement nor the performance rule, 
and is done only under the execution rule. Throughout the country it 
represents a negligible minority.78 
(3) Apply the law of the place of performance to performance facts. 
This is consistent with both the Restatement and the performance rule. 
( 4) Apply the law of the place of performance to execution facts. 
This is consistent with the performance rule, but not with the Restatement. 
5. LAW OF PLACE OF EXECUTION-EXECUTION FACTS 
Only two actual decisions to this effect have been found. In Palmer 
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad/9 a carriage case involving several 
jurisdictions of performance, Mr. Commissioner Searls said: 
"The law of the place where the contract is made governs in 
determining the liability of the carrier, unless the parties at the 
time of making it had some other law in view. [citing cases] 
"There are e.."Cceptions to this rule founded upon the supposed 
intention of the parties, gathered from circumstances surrounding 
the transaction. [citing case] 
"Thus much is said to indicate that the question is not overlooked. 
The eause, so far [as] can be determined from the record, was 
tried upon the theory that the law of California is applicable. 
There is no suggestion that the law of Missouri, where the contract 
for transportation was m~de, was put in evidence. 
"Under such circumstances we are not at liberty to assume as a 
fact that the state of Missouri has a special statute on the subject, 
but must presume as a question of law that the law of that state is 
the same as our own."80 
Applieability of the law, of the place of execution could be supported upon 
the ground that there were several jurisdictions of performance, in which 
event it has become the settled rule throughout the country81 that, as a 
matter of necessity, the law of the place of execution must be applied. 82 
In Flittner v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,83 California law was 
used to determine the capacity of an infant to execute in California a 
contract to be performed in New York. In the opinion, Mr. Justice 
78See text, sttpra, at footnote #17. 
79101 Cal. 187, 35 Pac. 630 (1894); consult California Annotations, Conflict 
of Laws Restatement (1939), §338. 
80Palmer v. Atchison etc. R. R., 101 Cal. 187, 195, 35 Pac. 630, 633 (1894). 
81Certain corporation cases, such as Thomas v. Wentworth Hotel Co., 158 
Cal. 275, 110 Pac. 942, 139 Am.St.Rep. 120 (1910), discussed in text, infra, at 
footnote #102, and Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144, 22 Sup.Ct. 52, 46 L.Ed. 125 
(1901), being an exception. 
B2Except as to certain details of local practice, such as whether delivery from 
a ship is to be made to lighter or upon a wharf. 
8330 Cal.App. 209, 157 Pac. 630 (1916), hearing denied by supreme court. 
Consult California Annotations, Conflict of Laws Restatement (1939), §§311, 317 
& 333. 
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Kerrigan worked out a distinction something like that of the Restatement-
that matters of execution, interpretation,84 validity and capacity are governed 
by the law of the place of execution, and matters of construction, Bll legal 
effect, and performance by the law of the place of performance. The 
result reached is also supported by reasoning based upon the fact that 
California was the domicile of the minor (as well as the forum). This 
reasoning would indicate that capacity to enter into a contract is an 
attribute of status, and not a contract matter. It would, of course, be 
possible, although illogical, to deny capacity if found wanting from either 
a contract or status standpoint. The privileges and immunities clause pro-
hibits a special rule to protect citizens of the forum. 
There are a number of dicta that the law of the place of execution 
governs matters relating to execution-an easy assumption to make when 
of no immediate moment. In Lawson v. Worms,86 before the codes, it was 
argued that the English rule in regard to recovery back of advanced freight 
upon a voyage to this country was different from the American. The 
majority of the court found that this was not true, Mr. Justice Terry, 
however, concluding his discussion with the statement: 
"I must hold it to be the rule which prevails in England, and it 
must consequently control the decision of this case."87 
The dissenting opinion was based upon a different view of the English 
law. It will be noted that here again there were several jurisdictions of 
performance. The opinion does not state why the English law was regarded 
as controlling. 
In Fenton v. Edwards & Johnson,S8 involving the validity of a general 
assignment for the benefit of creditors, Mr. Commissioner Cooper said: 
"It is the rule of all the states of the Union that a contract valid 
in the place where it is made is valid everywhere. [citing texts and 
case] 
"Certain exceptions are stated in the books in cases where a con-
tract or sale affects property situate in a different state from tp.e 
one in which the sale is made, or the revenue laws of another state, 
or if it conflicts with the interest of another state or its citizens."80 
84It will be recalled that Cal.Gv.Code, §1646, quoted in the text, sttpra, at 
footnote #18, expressly requires that interpretation be governed by the law of the 
place of performance. 
85It is especially objectionable to look to the law of the place of performance 
for construction, and to the law of the place of execution for interPretation. 
866 Cal. 365 (1856) ; consult California Annotations, Conflict of Laws Re-
statement (1939), §§337 & 346. 
B7Lawson v. Worms, 6 Cal. 365, 371 (1856). 
88125 Cal. 43, 58 Pac. 320, 46 L.R.A. 832, 77 Am.St.Rep. 141 (1899) ; consult 
California Annotations, Conflict of Laws Restatement (1939), §350. 
89Fenton v. Edwards & Johnson, 125 Cal. 43, 46, 58 Pac. 320, 321, 46 L.R.A. 
832, 833, 77 Am.St.Rep. 141, 143 (1899). 
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In Navajo County Bank v. Dolson,90 relating to a note made and payable 
in Arizona, Mr. Justice Angellotti said: 
''Whether or not the note involved here was a negotiable instru-
ment must be determined by the law of the place where the contract 
between the parties was made." [citing text ]91 
In Mercantile Acceptance Company v. Frank,92 in which there had been 
removal to California of an automobile subject to Minnesota purchase 
money chattel mortgage, Mr. Justice Curtis said: 
"It is a well-recognized principle of law in this state, as well as 
other jurisdictions, that the law of the place where a contract is 
made determines its validity." [quoting 5 Cal. J ur. 449 and citing 
texts and cases] 93 
In Bertonneau v. Southem Pacific Company,94 the performance rule was 
recognized, but it was held that it could not be applied to a carriage contract 
because of the existence of several States of performance. However, before 
coming to discussion of the performance rule, Mr. Justice James said: 
"It must be admitted that the general rule affecting the determina-
tion of the liabilities of parties to a contract requires that the law 
of the place where the contract is made shall govern. This rule 
admits of some variation in practice, dependent sometimes upon the 
question as to where the contract is to be performed, and always 
subject to the intention of the parties as expressed or implied from 
their acts and conduct at the time of making the contract. 'The 
law of the place where the contract is made governs in determining 
the liability of the carrier, unless the parties at the time of making 
it had some other law in view.' (Palmer v. Atchison etc. R. R. 
Co., 101 Cal. 187, [35 Pac. 630].) This case cites with approval, 
among other cases, that of Liverpool etc. Steam Co. v. Phenix 
hs. Co., 129 U. S. 397, [9 Sup. Ct. 469, 32 L. Ed. 788], in which 
the supreme court of the United States exhaustively reviews differ-
ent decisions touching this question, and, after noting the conflict 
existing between various of the authorities, deduces a general rule 
as follows : 'This review of the principal cases demonstrates that 
according to the great preponderance, if not the uniform concur-
rence, of authority, the general rule, that the nature, the obligation 
and the interpretation of a contract are to be governed by the law 
of the place where it is made, unless the parties at the time of 
90163 CaL 485, 126 Pac. 153, 41 L.R.A.[N.S.] 287 (1912); consult California 
Annotations, Conflict of Laws Restatement (1939), §§311, 323 & 336. 
91Navajo County Bank v. Dolson, 163 Cal. 485, 489, 126 'Pac. 153, 155, 41 L.R.A. 
[N.S.] 287 (1912). 
92203 Cal. 483, 265 Pac. 190, 57 A.L.R. 696 (1928); consult California Annota-
tions, Conflict of Laws Restatement (1939), §334. 
03Mercantile Acceptance Co. v. Frank, 203 Cal. 483, 485, 265 Pac. 190, 191, 57 
A.L.R. 696, 697 (1928). Upon the securities aspects of the conflict of laws problem 
involved in this case, consult Note, 1 SouTHERN CALIFORNIA LAw REVIEW, 474 (1928). 
9417 Cal.App. 439, 120 Pac. 53 (1911) ; consult California Annotations, Conflict 
of Laws Restatement (1939), §§337 & 346. 
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making it have some other law in view, requires a contract of 
affreightment, made in one country between citizens or residents 
thereof, and the performance of which begins there, to be governed 
by the law of that country, unless the parties, when entering into 
the contract, clearly manifest a mutual intention that it shall be 
governed by the law of some other country.' We cite, also: 2 
Wharton on Conflict of Laws, sec. 47lb; 1 Hutchinson on Car-
riers,, sec. 201 et seq. Unless, then, some fact, circumstance or 
condition appears affecting the contract for shipment as it was 
made in this case, which would entitle defendant to invoke the 
law of this state in limitation of the amount of recovery, it follows 
that the rights of the parties must be measured by the common-
law rule.''95 
6. LAW OF PLACE OF EXECUTION-PERFORMANCE FACTS 
Nothing really in point upon this has been found. The public policy 
elements present in workmen's compensation cases prevail against ordinary 
contract principles. However, it may be worth noting that in Alaska 
Packers' Association v. Industrial Accident Commission,96 it was said, per 
Cttriam:97 
''Where the duty to pay compensation is contractual, as under the 
optional acts, the rights of the injured party, wherever the injury 
is received, may, according to recognized principles, be controlled 
by the law of the place of contract.''08 
7. LAW OF PLACE OF PERFORMANCE--PERFORMANCE FACTS 
Application of the law of the place of performance here would seem 
to be so clear as to require little discussion. It is in harmony with both 
the Restatement and performance rules, and the California code provisions 
lean in this direction. It has been pointed out that the rule applying the 
law of the place of execution to all contract matters represents a negligible 
minority. 00 
The Flittner case,1°0 already discussed, 101, working out a distinction 
something like that of the Restatement, recognized the performance rule 
here by way of dictum. Cases as to stockholders' liability are hardly in 
05Bertonneau v. Southern Pac. Co., 17 Cal.App. 439, 443, 120 Pac. 53, 54 (1911). 
061 Ca1.(2d) 250, 34 Pac.(2d) 716 (1934), affd. 294 U.S. 532, 55 Sup.Ct. 518, 
79 L.Ed. 1044 (1935) ; consult California Annotations, Conflict of Laws Restatement 
(1939), §§346 & 347. 
97The writer objects to per c1triam opinions. First, judges, if not lawyers (under 
the State Bar Act), are at least human beings, and the interest in an opinion is 
lessened if the personal element is removed. Second, if a professor docs not know 
what judge he is talking about, he can not castigate him before his classes with the 
proper scorching effect. 
98Alaska Packers' Assn. v. Ind. Ace. Comm., 1 Ca1.(2d) 250, 256, 34 Pac.(2d) 
716, 719 (1934). 
90Consult text, supra, at footnotes ##17 & 78. 
lOOFlittncr v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 30 Cal.App. 209, 157 Pac. 630 (1916). 
lOlText, supra, at footnotes ##SJ-85. 
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point as to contract matters generally. However, in such a case, Thomas v. 
Wentworth Hotel Contpany/02 it was said, by Mr. Justice Sloss: 
"It is true, as contended, that the liability of stockholders rests 
upon contract and that the terms of the contract between the incor-
porators are ordinarily to be ascertained from the articles of 
incorporation, read in the light of the statute which authorizes the 
creation of the corporate body. But, as is pointed out by the 
supreme court of the United States in Pinney v. Nelson, 183 
U. S. 144, [22 Sup. Ct. 52], when a contract is made with refer-
ence to the laws of a jurisdiction other than that of the place of 
contracting, the parties will be deemed to have incorporated into 
their agreement the law of the jurisdiction with reference to which 
they were contracting." [Quoting Pinney v. Nelson.]1°3 
After pointing out that it can make no difference whether the freedom 
of a stockholder from individual liability is by virtue of statute or consti-
tution alone, or is, pursuant to statutory authority, set forth in the articles, 
the learned justice continued: 
". . . In so far as the charter or articles declare an intent to 
do business in another state, the law of that state becomes, so far 
as concerns business there done, a part of the contract."104 
In Losso1t v. Blodgett/05 a contract in California for the sale of 
Mexican land was held void when it developed that, under Mexican law, 
the buyers as aliens would be unable to take.106 
8. LAW OF PLACE OF PERFORMANCE-EXECUTION FACTS 
Application of the performance rule here is in conflict \vith the 
Restatement. Before the codes, it was held, in Young v. Pearson/01 that 
a partnership agreement in Louisiana to conduct a business in California 
did not have to be in writing, Mr. Justice Bennett saying: 
"Whatever the law of Louisiana may be, the law of California 
does not require that a partnership agreement should be in writing. 
The partnership business was to be prosecuted here, and the con-
tract must be governed by the laws of this state."108 
102158 Cal. 275, 110 •Pac. 942, 139 Am.St.Rep. 120 (1910); consult California 
Annotations, Conflict of Laws Restatement (1939), §345. 
103Thomas v. Wentworth Hotel Co., 158 Cal. 275, 280, 110 Pac. 942, 944, 139 
Am.St.Rep. 120, 123 (1910). 
104Thomas v. Wentworth Hotel Co., 158 Cal. 275, 280, 110 Pac. 942, 944, 139 
Am.St.Rep. 120, 124 (1910). 
1051 Cal.App.(2d) 13, 36 Pac.(2d) 147 (1934), hearing denied by supreme court; 
consult California Annotations, Conflict of Laws Restatement (1939), §§340 & 347. 
106The Restatement, §360(1), provides as to this situation that there is "no 
obligation to perform so long as the illegality continues." 
1071 Cal. 448 (1851) ; consult California Annotations, Conflict of Laws Restate-
ment (1939), §§334 & 342. 
108Young v. Pearson, 1 Cal. 448, 450 (1851). 
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Also before the codes, in Dow v. Gould & Curry Silver Mining 
Compatty}09 the validity of a gift in California between husband and wife, 
domiciled in this State, of stock in a California corporation operating in 
Nevada, was involved. In addition to holding that the question was 
governed by the law of the domicile, Mr. Justice Rhodes said: 
"A gift is not perfect, nor does any interest pass to the proposed 
donee, until there has been a delivery by the donor and an accept-
ance by the donee. Both of those acts were performed in this 
State, and for that reason, if there could be any doubt that the 
question was dependent upon the lex domicilii, the validity of the 
gift is to be determined by the laws of this State. No authority 
is cited upon this precise point, but it would appear that such must 
be the rule, both upon principle and in analogy to contracts between 
persons residing or being in different places. As to contracts 
made by persons thus situated, the rule is that they are to be 
interpreted by the law of the place where they became complete 
contracts, unless they are to be performed elsewhere. (Story 
Con. of Laws, Sec. 283.)"110 
It has been pointed out that the form of statement used in the closing 
sentence is a round-about method of stating the performance rule.111 
Progresso Steamship Company v. St. Paul, etc., Insurance Company,112 
while possibly dictum, because the place of execution is not definitely 
stated,U3 is apparently an authority in point, although, because of the 
absence of disagreement between counsel, not a strong one. It involved 
construction of the clause "warranted free from all average and salvage" 
in a marine insurance policy. Mr. Commissioner Smith said : 
"In discussing this question it is rightly assumed by the counsel 
that as the contract provides for performance in San Francisco, 
the California law must govern.''114 
In Pratt v. Dittmer,115 w~le no Iowa law was presented to the court, 
it was held that notes executed in California116 and payable in Iowa were 
10931 Cal. 629 (1867) ; consult California Annotations, Conflict of Laws Re-
statement (1939), §311. 
110Dow v. Gould & Curry S. M. Co., 31 Cal. 629, 652 (1867). 
111Text, s1tpra, at footnote #23, and said footnote. 
112146 Cal. 279, 79 Pac. 967 (1905) ; consult California Annotations, Conflict of 
Laws Restatement (1939), §346. 
113Jnsurance was issued upon two steamships, about to be towed from Port-
land, Oregon, to St. Michael, Alaska. The only performance contemplated was pay-
ment of the loss, so that different places of performance were not involved. 
114Progresso S. S. Co. v. St. Paul etc. Ins. Co., 146 Cal. 279, 280, 79 Pac. 967, 
968 (1905). 
11551 Cal.App. 512, 197 :Pac. 365 (1921) ; consult California Annotations, Con-
flict of Laws Restatement (1939), §§339, 349 & 373. 
116The notes were attached to the contract in connection with which they 
were given, the contract providing that the notes were to be detached from the 
contract by the payee. The opinion states that the agreement between the parties, 
signed by the maker of the notes and by the duly authorized agent of the payee, 
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governed as to negotiability by the law of Iowa, Mr. Justice Craig saying: 
"The notes were payable in Iowa and are to be interpreted,U'~' 
therefore, under the law of that state."118 
BertO'nneau v. Southern Pacific Company,U9 by way of dictum,120 
recognizes the controlling effect of the law of the place of performance. 
V. SUMMARY AND CoNCLUSION 
Disregarding the special problems relating to the intention of the 
parties, we have the following in favor of the performance rule as the 
law of this State : 
(1) A code provision requiring its adoption at least in part.121 
(2) A district court of appeal decision citing Section 1646 of the 
Civil Code, 'and applying the law of the place of performance to a question 
of validity.122 
(3) A district court of appeal decision citing Section 1646 and apply-
ing the law of the place of performance to a question of negotiability.12s 
Hearing in this case in the supreme court is apparently to the same e:ffect.1u 
( 4) A district court of appeal decision weakly applying Section 1646 
to justify admission of evidence of a custom at the place of performance 
apparently within the same State as the place of execution.125 
was made in California upon the date borne by the notes. While the opinion does 
not state whether the contract and notes were sent to the payee in Iowa by the 
maker or by the payee's agent, the conclusion seems reasonable that this was done 
by the payee's agent who had signed the agreement, and that the notes, as well as 
the contract to which attached, became legally effective instrnments upon delivery 
to the payee's agent in California. In view of the facts stated in the opinion, it 
would be a far-fetched assumption to believe that the notes became effective at a 
later date and in a different State from the contract to which they were attached; 
under such an assumption, the portion of the opinion quoted in the text would 
become dictum. 
117The question was not really one of interpretation, but of negotiability. The · 
decision was placed, also, on the ground of estoppel. 
118Pratt v. Dittmer, 51 Cal.App. 512, 517, 197 Pac. 365, 368 (1921). 
11917 Cal.App. 439, 120 Pac. 53 (1911) ; consult California Annotations, Con-
flict of Laws Restatement (1939), §§337 & 346. 
120Bertonneau v. Southern Pac. Co., 17 Cal.App. 439, 444, 120 Pac. 53, 55 
(1911). The dictum is inferential, as the court simply avoids giving effect to de-
cisions applying the law of the place of performance. 
121Consult text, S1tpra, at footnotes ##18-21. 
122Blochman Comml. & Sav. Bank v. Ketcham, 36 Cal.App. 284, 171 Pac. 1084 
(1918), discussed in text, S1tpra, at footnotes ##60-63. 
123Utah State Natl. Bank v. Smith, 26 Cal.App.Dec. 1195 (1918), discussed in 
text, S1tPra, at footnotes # # 64-68. 
124The supreme court decision is discussed in the text, supra, at footnotes 
##66-68. 
125Pray v. Trower Lbr. Co., 101 Cal.App. 482, 281 Pac. 1036 (1929), discussed 
in text, supra, at footnotes ##69-70. 
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(5) A supreme court stockholder's liability case applying the law of 
the place of performance (not really in point).126 
( 6) A district court of appeal decision applying the law of the place 
of performance to a problem of validity of a contract when illegal at the 
place of performance.127, 
(7) A supreme court decision before the codes applying the law of 
the place of performance to determine whether a contract must be in 
writing.128 
(8) A supreme court decision applying the law of the place of 
performance to the interpretation of a policy of marine insurance.120 
(9) A weak district court of appeal decision applying the law of 
the place of performance in a note case.180 
(10) Three dicta, one in the supreme court before the codes and two 
in district courts of appeal since the codes131 (one only in part, along 
Restatement lines.)1a2 
Against the performance rule we have: 
( 1) A supreme court decision, in a carriage case with several juris-
dictions of performance, applying the law of the place of execution upon a 
presumption that it was the same as that of California.133 
(2) A district court of appeal decision applying the law of the place 
of execution to the contractual capacity of an infant, also reasoning that 
the same jurisdiction was the domicile as well as the forum.134 
126Thomas v. Wentworth Hotel Co., 158 Cal. 275, 110 Pac. 942, 139 Am.St.Rep. 
120 (1910), discussed in text, supra, at footnotes ##102-104. 
127Losson v. Blodgett, 1 Cai.App.(2d) 13, 36 [>ac.(2d) 147 (1934), discussed 
in text, Sltpra, at footnotes ##105-106. 
128Young v. Pearson, 1 Cal. 448 (1851), discussed in text, supra, at footnotes 
##107-108. 
129Progresso S. S. Co. v. St. Paul etc. Ins. Co., 146 Cal. 279, 79 Pac. 967 (1905), 
discussed in text, SltPra, at footnotes ##112-114. 
lSOPratt v. Dittmer, 51 Cai.App. 512, 197 Pac. 365 (1921), discussed in text, 
supra, at footnotes ## 115-118. 
131Dow v. Gould & Curry S. M. Co., 31 Cal 629 (1867), discussed in text, 
supra, at footnotes # #109-111; Flittner v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 30 Cai.App. 
209, 157 Pac. 630 (1916), discussed in text, Sltpra, at footnotes ##100-101; Berton-
neau v. Southern Pac. Co., 17 Cai.App. 439, 120 Pac. 53 (1911), discussed in text, 
SltPra, at footnotes ##119-120. 
182Flittner v. Equitable Life Ass. Co., 30 Cai.App. 209, 157 [>ac. 630 (1916), 
discussed in text, SltPra, at footnotes ##83-85, 100-101. 
133Palmer v. Atchison etc. R. R., 101 Cal. 187, 35 Pac. 630 (1894), discussed in 
text, supra, at footnotes ##79-82. 
134Flittner v. Equitable Life Ass. Co., 30 Cal.App. 209, 157 Pac. 630 (1916), 
discussed in text, supra, at footnotes ##83-85, 100-101. 
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(3) Six dicta, one in the supreme court before the codes,l35 four in 
the supreme court after the codes136 (one not really in point because 
relating to workmen's compensation acts),l37 and one in a district court 
of appea1.138 
The conclusion seems to be justified that it is the rule of this State 
that the law of the place of performance governs all contract matters. 
1311Lawson v. Worms, 6 Cal. 365 (1856), discussed in text, supra, at footnotes 
##FiJ-87. 
l86Fenton v. Edwards & Johnson, 125 Cal. 43, 58 Pac. 320. 46 L.RA. 832, 
77 Am.St.Rep. 141 (1899), discussed in text, supra, at footnotes ##88-89; Navajo 
County Bank v. Dolson, 163 Cal. 485, 126 Pac. 153, 41 L.R.A.[N.S.] 287 (1912), 
discussed in te..-,:t, supra, at footnotes # #90-91 ; Mercantile Acceptance Co. v. Frank, 
203 Cal. 483, 265 Pac. 190, 57 A.L.R 696 (1928), discussed in text, supra, at 
footnotes ##92-93; Alaska Packers' Assn. v. Ins. Ace. Comm., 1 Cal.(2d) 250, 34 
Pac. (2d) 716 (1934), affd. 294 U.S. 532, 55 Sup. Ct. 518, 79 L.Ed. 1044 (1935), 
discussed in text, sttpra, at footnotes # #96-98. 
137Alaska Packers' Assn. v. Ind. Ace. Comm., 1 Ca1.(2d) 250, 34 IJ?ac.(2d) 
716 (1934), affd., 294 U.S. 532, 55 Sup.Ct. 518, 79 L.Ed. 1044 (1935), discussed 
in text, stiPra, at footnotes ##96-98. 
lSBBertonneau v. Southern Pac. Co., 17 Cal.App. 439, 120 Pac. 53 (1911), dis-
cussed in text, mpra, at footnotes- ##94-95. 
